The 32nd Division Veteran Association
	The 32nd Infantry Division in World War II "The Red Arrow" Part 10 Southern Philippines Campaign - Leyte

Mr. Howard Kelley, a 32nd Infantry Division Veteran, has written a book describing his service during World War II. In Born in the U.S.A. - Raised in New Guinea, he shares some of his most personal experiences as a member of the 'Red Arrow's' 3rd Battalion, 127th Infantry. This book offers a rare, first-hand glimpse of the 32nd Infantry Division in World War II, as seen through the eyes of an enlisted GI. Click on the book cover to the left, it will take you to Mr. Kelley's web site, where you will find information about how to purchase this book

A mountain range, reaching 4,000 feet, runs from the northwest end of the island to the southeast end. These heavily wooded mountains strongly favor the defense and present a formidable obstacle to rapid troop movements between the western and eastern coasts. This range separates the Ormoc Valley in the west from the Leyte Valley to the east; both valleys are important for military control of the island. The Leyte Valley, in the northeast section of the island, is where most of the airfields, key roads, and sizable cities are located.

LG Walter Krueger's (CO of Sixth Army) concept for the seizure and control of Leyte consisted of three phases.

    "Phase I provided for preliminary amphibious operations to secure the islands which dominate the eastern entrances to the Leyte Gulf.
    "Phase II was to be a major amphibious assault on the northern beaches of the eastern coast and the seizing of airfield and base sites on the coastal strip in that area, followed immediately by an advance to the northwest to gain control of Leyte Valley, the Carigara beaches, and San Juanico Strait.
    "Phase III comprised the overland and shore-to-shore operations to destroy the remaining Japanese forces on Leyte, and the seizure and occupation of southwestern Samar." (Blakeley 179)

On the eve of the attack, Sixth Army G-2 believed that Japanese strength on Leyte was about 21,700 troops, about half of which were from the Japanese 16th Division and the remainder consisting mainly of service troops. However, they realized that the enemy would probably be able to reinforce this garrison with units from other nearby islands.

A-Day for the attack on Leyte was set for 20 October 1944. This assault would be the largest operation in the Pacific Theater to date. For the first time during WWII, the vast majority of all of the Allied air and naval forces in the Central Pacific and Southwest Pacific Areas would be focused on a single operation; providing either direct or indirect support for the 202,500 ground troops initially committed to the invasion of Leyte.

The main naval elements consisted of Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet and Admiral William F. Halsey's Third Fleet. The Navy would provide the majority of the air support during the initial stages of the operation.

The Allied Air Forces, commanded by LG George C. Kenney, were comprised of MG Ennis P. Whitehead's Fifth Air Force, MG St. Clair Streett's Thirteenth Air Force, and Air Vice Marshal William D. Bostock's Royal Australian Air Force. In addition to providing air support for the ground forces on Leyte, the Allied Air Forces would also provide air cover for the naval forces.

The ground forces, LG Krueger's Sixth Army, were made up of MG John R. Hodge's XXIV Corps (7th and 96th Infantry Divisions), MG Franklin C. Sibert's X Corps (1st Cavalry Division and 24th Infantry Division), the Sixth Army Reserve (32nd and 77th Infantry Divisions), and the 6th Ranger Battalion.

Phase I of the invasion of Leyte began in the early morning hours of 17 October as the 6th Ranger Battalion assaulted several small islands at the opening of Leyte Gulf. One of their key tasks was to set up navigation lights that would direct the assault convoys to the landing beaches. At the same time, Navy mine sweepers began clearing mines from Leyte Gulf and the landing areas. Under water demolition teams began looking for Japanese-made and natural obstacles off the coast of the landing beaches. Navy destroyers provided gunfire support to these elements and also started to target Japanese facilities and defenses in the landing areas.

At 2300 on 19 October the main assault elements arrived off Leyte Gulf. They had embarked in three main groups. The XXIV Corps had embarked at Hawaii, the 1st Cavalry Division embarked at Manus in the Admiralties, and the 24th Division embarked at Hollandia on New Guinea. The three groups linked up along the way and formed one huge convoy, so they could arrive off Leyte at the same time. This immense convoy was comprised of over 1,171 ships (this number does not include the ships carrying the 1st Cav. Div.), from huge battleships and 5,000-man transports to small landing craft. "The largest convoy ever seen in the Pacific up to that time. (Cannon 41)" This convoy did not include numerous naval support elements, such as the four carrier tasks groups, which were in the area to support the assault, but weren't part of the convoy.

Due to a shortage of naval transports, the Sixth Army Reserve was held at its staging areas (the 32nd Division at Hollandia and the 77th Division at Guam) until transports from the assault force could be freed to go pick them up. It was estimated that it would be mid-November by the time these two reserve divisions could be brought forward to Leyte.

    "The Japanese were quick to react to this major threat to their control of the Philippine Islands, and to all the rest of their southern empire. General George C. Marshall tells what happened in his Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff for the 1943-1945 period:
    "On 19 October two assault forces, the 3d commanded by Admiral Wilkinson and the 7th commanded by Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, approached the east coast of Leyte with the Sixth Army under General Krueger aboard. It was an armada of combat and assault vessels that stretched across the vast Pacific horizon. In the covering naval forces were the battleships CALIFORNIA, MISSISSIPPI, MARYLAND, PENNSYLVANIA, TENNESSEE, and WEST VIRGINIA with their screen of cruisers and destroyers. The troops and material with which we were to seize Leyte were loaded in 53 assault transports, 54 assault cargo ships, 151 landing ships (tank), 72 landing craft (infantry), 16 rocket ships, and over 400 other assorted amphibious craft. The air cover was provided by planes from 18 escort carriers.
    "Out to sea Admiral Halsey’s mighty carrier task force, which helped prepare the way for the landings by air bombardment, now stood watch for possible Japanese naval opposition to the landings. That day a Japanese search plane discovered this great amphibious force and reported its presence to Admiral Kurita’s Singapore fleet, which then constituted 60 percent of Japan’s major naval units. This report precipitated one of the decisive battles of history.
    "The X and XXIV Corps of the Sixth Army went ashore on schedule the following day after the Navy had paved its way with drum-fire bombardment. Three days later Gen. MacArthur directed the ground forces to secure their beach areas and await the outcome of the naval battle which was now impending. The Japanese made the decision to commit their fleet in the battle to prevent America’s return to the Philippines.
    "By 26 October it was apparent that the Third and Seventh Fleets had virtually eliminated Japan as a sea power.
    "The battle for Leyte Gulf was, as General Marshall calls it, “one of the decisive battles of history.” Its results of course affected the future activities of the 32d Division as it did those of all Allied forces engaged in the struggle against Japan. Another major development leading up to the [32nd] Division’s next commitment to combat was the Japanese decision to reinforce their ground forces on Leyte.
    "Field Marshal Count Hisaichi Terauchi was the supreme commander of all the troops in Japan’s great conquered area in the Southwest Pacific. His headquarters was in Manila. The 14th Area Army, until recently commanded by Lieutenant General Shigenori Kuroda, was charged with the defense of the Philippines. It had a strength of over 260,000 men but they were scattered all over the Philippines, and Allied air and naval pressure was making it increasingly difficult to move them from place to place. Terauchi, expecting an attack somewhere in the Philippines, secured General Tomoyuki Yamashita, an officer with an outstanding war record, to replace General Kuroda. Although the landing on Leyte achieved complete strategic surprise in terms of timing, weight, and location, it was soon evident that the Japanese were going to make every effort to hold the island. Reinforcements were moved in from Mindanao, Luzon, Cebu, Panay and other islands." (qtd. in Blakeley 180-3)

At 0600 on 20 October, the six battleships of the assault force commenced firing on the landing beaches. At 0900 the battleships ceased fire and the cruisers and destroyers, which had moved in closer to the beaches, commenced fire. At 0945 the cruisers and destroyers shifted their fire from the landing beaches to inland targets and the flanks of the landing beaches. During this time frame, navy carrier-based aircraft also targeted Japanese facilities and defenses inland from the beaches.

At H-Hour, 1000, on 20 October 1944, the 174,000 troops assigned to Sixth Army's initial assault force began landing at their assigned beaches on northern Leyte's east coast, opening Phase II of the operation. X Corps landed near Marasbaras and Palo with the 1st Cavalry Division and 24th Infantry Division side by side. Fifteen miles to the south, XXIV Corps landed at San Jose and Dulag with the 96th Infantry Division and 7th Infantry Division side by side.

Earlier, at 0930 on 20 October, the 21st Infantry Regiment (detached from the 24th Division) landed at the southern tip of Leyte, near the Panaon Straight, to secure the entrance to Sogod Bay.

The initial objectives for X Corps were for the 1st Cavalry Division to turn north from their landing beach and secure Tacloban (the capital of Leyte) and its important air strip. Then this division was to secure the San Juanico Straight, the short, narrow stretch of water that separates Leyte from the island of Samar. Meanwhile the 24th Division would first seize Palo and then turn northwest toward the Leyte Valley. Both divisions were then to meet up at Carigara, on the Carigara Bay on the north end of Leyte.

Meanwhile, in the XXIV Corps area, the initial objectives were for the 96th Division to secure Highway 1 in its zone (the highway runs parallel to the coast in this area), then seize Catmon Hill (a large hill mass on the northern end of XXIV Corps' zone), and then the Dagami-Tanauan area. Part of the 7th Division was to secure the area around the Highway 1 bridge over the Daguitan (Marabang) River at Dao, while the remainder of the division was to capture the airfield at Dulag, then head west toward Burauen.

"But in the last few days of October a series of typhoons struck Leyte and the surrounding area and slowed down both our own operations and those of the Japanese. By the end of the first week in November, enemy reinforcements and the heavy rains had practically stopped Sixth Army’ advance. The weather also made the captured airfields largely useless." (Blakeley 183)

It was around this time that Field Marshall Terauchi decided to move his headquarters to Saigon, in French Indochina. This left General Yamashita in command of the defense of all the Philippines. The Japanese continued their efforts to reinforce their ground units on Leyte.

"By the middle of November, [Yamashita's] ground forces had increased to a strength of about 50,000 men, and this in spite of high casualties suffered both in battle and in the loss of transports bringing reinforcements. More Japanese planes were also transferred to the Philippines, and the Leyte operation rapidly developed into a great showdown of Japanese and Allied strength on land, on and under the sea, and in the air. For the Japanese, the war had reached a vital, decisive climax. Their use of planned suicide air attacks – the “Kamikaze” strikes – emphasized how fully they realized their situation." (Blakeley 183)

As soon as the infantry units moved beyond the invasion beaches, engineer units were put ashore to begin building supply dumps, improve the roads, and prepare the captured airfields for use by the Allied air forces. It was a daunting task, partly because of the difficult terrain and heavy rainfall, but also because the Japanese were still close enough to shell these areas with artillery and attack them from the air. As soon as the runways of the captured airfields could support planes, air force units were sent in to begin operating from them.

"Among the Army flyers of the 49th Fighter Group, an advance party of the Fifth Air Force that arrived on 27 October, was MAJ Richard I. Bong, of the 9th Fighter Squadron, the leading ace of the Army Air Forces. He celebrated his arrival by shooting down an enemy plane." (Cannon 96)

The 7th and 96th Divisions of XXIV Corps succeeding in taking their Phase II objectives by 1 November, but it had not been easy. The 2 divisions had suffered 2,095 casualties and 111 soldiers MIA. Some 6,980 Japanese had been killed, and only 25 had been captured. But now the southern part of the Leyte Valley was securely in U.S. hands and part of the 7th Division had also pushed across the middle of the island to the west coast. XXIV Corps was now ready to begin Phase III of the capture of Leyte, which included pushing north into the Ormoc Valley and securing the vital port at Ormoc.

By 2 November the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions of X Corps had successfully completed their Phase II missions on the northern part of Leyte. They had suffered 1308 casualties and 14 soldiers were MIA. About 3,709 Japanese had been killed, and only 22 were captured. Now the northern part of the Leyte Valley was secured and X Corps was set to commence its Phase III missions, pushing south through the Ormoc Valley to eventually link up with XXIV Corps.

"In the meanwhile, the Japanese had succeeded in bringing important reinforcements into the west coast port of Ormoc. These included elements of the Headquarters of the 35th Army, of the 30th and 102d Divisions, and several independent units. Most important was the arrival at Ormoc on 1 and 2 November of the crack 1st Division. This veteran unit was reputedly one of the four best, and perhaps the very best, of the top divisions of the Japanese Army. “It did more,” says General Krueger, “than any other enemy unit to prolong the Leyte operation".” (Blakeley 183)

By 7 November the Japanese, who had been continuously pushed westward since the U.S. invasion, were able to form a formidable defensive position at the northern entrance to the Ormoc Valley. The 24th Infantry Division, beginning its push south from Carigara Bay along Highway 2 into the Ormoc Valley, ran into this stubborn defense north of Limon at Breakneck Ridge and were initially pushed back.

"Breakneck Ridge, over which Highway 2 corkscrewed its way between Pinamopoan and Limon for about 7,500 yards, was actually a hill mass with many spurs branching off from an irregularly shaped crest line toward the shores of Carrigara Bay to the north and the Leyte River valley to the south. Shoulder-high cogon grass was thick on the low ground, and the pockets between the hills were heavily forested. The valleys were deep, with precipitous sides. The 1st [Japanese] Division had heavily fortified the area, taking advantage of the innumerable thickly wooded pockets that served as natural forts. The Japanese had also built an elaborate system of trenches and other defensive positions and had honeycombed the area with spider holes. Many of the latter were on reverse slopes some distance below the crests and were protected from direct fire. In front of each spider hole the enemy had cut fire lanes through the cogon grass, which was left so short that even a crawling soldier would be exposed to fire. The constant rainfall made the hills slippery and treacherous, and, more important, provided a protective curtain in the day and covered movements of the enemy at night." (Cannon 211)

Gen. Krueger attempted to reduce this enemy pressure at the north end of the Ormoc Valley by having XXIV Corps continue to push its 7th Infantry Division north along the western coast of Leyte. He also determined that it was time to commit his Sixth Army Reserve, the 77th and 32nd Infantry Divisions. The 77th Infantry Division would be assigned to XXIV Corps and would enter Leyte with an amphibious assault south of Ormoc on the west coast in the near future. The 32nd Infantry Division, currently located at Morotai and Hollandia, would be brought in to reinforce X Corps at the north end of the Ormoc Valley.

"Carrying out this plan, the 24th Infantry Division recaptured Breakneck Ridge by 14 November except for several spurs still in enemy hands. The rest of X Corps made slow but steady progress in the adjoining areas. XXIV Corps also maintained pressure on the enemy and prepared itself to do its part in destroying the enemy forces on the west coast. But in the meantime the Japanese had succeeded in getting another Division, the 26th, ashore near Ormoc on 9 November." (Blakeley 184) One company from the 632nd Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached to the 21st Infantry Regiment while the 24th Infantry Division was fighting to recapture Breakneck Ridge.

The 32nd Division was assigned to the Sixth Army Reserve for the Leyte invasion on 27 September. The 32nd Division was ordered to be ready for movement to Leyte on 24 hours' notice after A-day plus 3, 23 October. "Actually there was no possibility of the Division’s reaching Leyte before the middle of November because its movement there depended on the turnaround of part of the shipping used in the assault landings" (Blakeley 184).

"General Krueger had originally intended to use the 32d to gain control of southern Samar [a large, nearby island northeast of Leyte], but the small number of Japanese there coupled with the situation on the front of X Corps decided him to attach the Division to X Corps “in order to impart impetus to the offensive and to give some rest to the tired troops of the 24th Division, which had been continuously in action for over three weeks”." (Blakeley 184)

On 14 November the 32nd Division, minus the 121st FA BN (which had departed Biak bound for Hollandia on 13 Nov.), landed on the eastern beaches of Leyte. It is interesting to note that the 112th Cavalry Regiment, which was attached to and fought with the 32nd Division at Aitape, landed on Leyte the same day, and was attached to the 1st Cavalry Division.

Map of northern end of the Ormoc Valley on Leyte between 16 November and 14 December 1944, from Leyte: The Return to the Philippines.

On 16 November the 32nd Division started to relieve the 24th Infantry Division at Breakneck Ridge. Several units from the 24th Division would be left in place under the operational control of the 32nd Division to protect its flanks. These units included the 2nd BN, 19th Inf. Reg. which had established an important roadblock on Highway 2 south of Limon; the 3rd BN, 34th Inf. Reg. which was on Kilay Ridge about 700 yards west of the 2nd BN, 19th Infantry's roadblock; and 3 field artillery battalions.

On 18 November 3rd BN, 128th Inf., was ordered to discontinue its advance to allow the 1st BN to catch up. The 1st BN attempted to advance up Corkscrew Ridge, but strong opposition prevented them from making much progress.

"Elements of the 57th Infantry had dug in on the reverse slope of the ridge, and heavy jungle prevented complete observation of these enemy positions. The Japanese regiment had placed automatic weapons to command the only routes of approach, thus forcing the American troops to move uphill in the face of hostile fire. The 2d [Japanese] Artillery Battalion had placed its guns so that they covered Highway 2." (Cannon 224)

The 1st BN, 128th Inf., continued to assault Corkscrew Ridge through 20 November, while the 3rd BN held its position on a ridge looking down on Limon.

On 21 November COL Hettinger (CO of the 128th Inf.) decided to bring up his 2nd BN (LTC Herbert A. Smith) to join 3rd BN in an attack on Limon the next day. Their mission was to capture Limon and seize the bridge (over a tributary of the Leyte River) south of the village. Meanwhile 1st BN was to continue to maintain pressure on the Japanese on Corkscrew Ridge. "During the night the 120th Field Artillery Battalion delivered harassing fire along the road between Limon and the Limon bridge. (Cannon 225)"

At 0800 on 22 November the attack commenced with the 2nd BN on the east side of Highway 2 and the 3rd BN on the west. The 3rd BN encountered almost no resistance and Co. I soon established itself on a bluff that overlooked the village and the bridge. The 2nd BN ran into determined opposition, but by around 1400 they, along with Co. K, were able to push through Limon and had crossed the tributary of the Leyte River south of the village. A strong Japanese counterattack pushed back the 2nd BN's left flank, which left Co. K in a precarious position. A particularly untimely flash flood of the stream left the advance elements of Co. K cut off south of the river. Eventually they were able to link up with Co. I on the bluff to their right. The 2nd BN and the remainder of Co. K established a position for the night on a ridge east of Limon.

"On 23 November the 128th Infantry straightened out its lines and consolidated  its positions. For the next three days activity was limited to extensive patrols and the placement of harassing fire on an east-west ridge that overlooked the highway about 1,000 yards south of Limon. Entrenched on this ridge, elements of the 1st [Japanese] Division successfully resisted until 10 December all efforts of the 32d Division to dislodge them." (Cannon 225)

NEW Photos added 26 July '04

U.S. Army Signal Corps photo Soldiers from the 128th Inf., 32nd Division, in Limon, Leyte, Philippine Islands.

U.S. Army Signal Corps photo Soldiers from the 128th Inf., 32nd Division, in Limon, Leyte, Philippine Islands, take cover as enemy shells impact.

The capture of Limon essentially signaled the end of the battle of Breakneck Ridge, although some Japanese pockets resisted bitterly until the middle of December. "The battle cost the 24th and 32d Divisions a total of 1,498 casualties, killed, wounded, and missing in action, as compared with an estimated 5,252 Japanese killed and 8 captured. (Cannon 225)" The cost had been great, but X Corps had secured the northern entrance to the Ormoc Valley and could now continue its push south to link up with XXIV Corps to eventually complete the eviction of the Japanese from Leyte.

"In no small measure, the establishment and maintenance of a roadblock south of Limon by the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry [Col. Spragins] , and the defense of Kilay Ridge in the rear of the Japanese front lines by the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry [LTC Thomas E. Clifford], had made this achievement possible. Under constant fire and greatly outnumbered, these units had prevented General Suzuki from sending additional troops into Limon". (Cannon 225)

Both of these units had been under the operational control of the 32nd Division since the relief of the 24th Division on Breakneck Ridge on 16 November. The 2nd BN, 19th Inf., had maintained its roadblock from 12-23 November under extremely difficult conditions. The 1st BN, 34th Inf. had been stubbornly holding Kilay Ridge since 10 November. Both units were often isolated, constantly outnumbered, under equipped, and under supplied. Both units received Presidential citations.

Late on 27 November a patrol from the 128th Inf. made contact with the 1st BN, 34th Inf. on Kilay Ridge to let them know that reinforcements were on the way. This was welcome news because LTC Clifford had been seeking reinforcements for some time. The 2nd BN, 128th Inf., reached Kilay Ridge on 29 November and were placed under LTC Clifford's control. Co. G, 128th Inf., the first to arrive, was immediately sent to reinforce Co. C, 34th Inf., the most threatened unit, on the southwest end of the ridge. When the remainder of the 2nd BN, 128th Inf., arrived it was initially held in reserve.

On 1 December, companies from both battalions attacked several knolls, believed to be key Japanese strongpoints, at the southeastern end of Kilay Ridge. While artillery and mortars from both battalions laid prepatory fire, Co. B (34th Inf.) sent out a patrol to attempt to approach the knolls from the rear. Meanwhile Co. E (128th Inf.) passed through Co. C (34th Inf.) in order to directly assault the knolls, while Co. C protected its flanks with heavy machine gun fire.

"The company [Co. E, 128th] took the first knoll easily, but heavy fire from behind a huge log on the second knoll halted Company E. Company A [34th Inf.] sent a bazooka team forward to knock out the position and Company C [34th Inf.] sent all of its grenades forward, but by 1320 the Japanese soldiers were still resisting all attempts to dislodge them." (Cannon 234)

No more progress was made that day and the patrol from Co. B (34th Inf.) returned about mid-afternoon to report that it had seen no Japanese activity near its objective.

    "On 1 December General Gill ordered the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry (Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Clifford, Jr., former All-American West Point football star), to withdraw from its position where it had done excellent work in preventing the Japanese from reinforcing the Limon Forces. His message concluded: “You and your men have not been forgotten. You are the talk of the island, and perhaps the United States. Army beat Notre Dame 59 to 0, the worst defeat on record.”
    "Actually, it was several days before the withdrawal of Colonel Clifford’s battalion could be completed. The Japanese were still resisting strongly although their 1st Division had already sustained over 3,000 battle casualties. From postwar examination of Japanese records it appears that the 1st Division’s mission was not changed from attack to defense until 6 December “when it had reached the stage of collapse.” The fact that the enemy continued to operate with an offensive mission for some time after the bulk of his forces were actually on the defense probably accounts in part for the sporadic fighting, involving all three infantry regiments of the 32d Division, which broke out repeatedly throughout the Division’s area." (Blakeley 185)

On the morning of 2 December, Co. E, 128th Inf., again attacked the Japanese positions on the knolls, while Co. F, 128th Inf., launched an assault against Japanese positions on another ridge south of Kilay Ridge. Co. E captured the knolls by about mid-day, and Co. F, after overcoming stiff opposition, gained the crest of the ridge by the end of the afternoon. Although the 1st BN, 34th Inf., started to withdraw from Kilay Ridge during the afternoon, their withdrawal was halted until 4 December and wasn't completed until two days later.

On 5 December, the 32nd Division consolidated its positions in preparation for a strong push down Highway 2. The renewed assault would be made with 2 regiments side by side, the 126th Infantry (COL Stanton) on the left (east) and the 127th Infantry (COL Frederick R. Stofft), which had passed through the 128th Inf., on the right.

On 5 December, PFC William A. McWhorter was helping his unit, Co. M, 126th Infantry, repel a fierce Japanese counterattack when he deliberately sacrificed his own life to save the life of his buddy. For his selfless sacrifice, PFC McWhorter was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

PFC McWhorter's Medal of Honor citation can be read on the 32nd Division Medal of Honor page of this web site.

On 6 December, the 127th Inf. moved out from its positions on the south side of the Leyte River west of Limon to resume the drive south along Highway 2. They soon ran into fierce opposition from excellently concealed, dug-in enemy positions on some high ground 1,000 yards south of the Leyte River bridge.

"The terrain that the troops traversed was adapted to defensive fighting, and the 1st [Japanese] Division took full advantage of this fact. There were deep ravines and steep hills where the enemy had dug in on both the forward and reverse slopes. The entire area was covered by heavy rain forest with dense underbrush. The nearly constant rainfall made observation difficult and the maps for the area were very inaccurate." (Cannon 325)

The 3rd BN, 127th Infantry, was cited in War Department orders for its outstanding performance during this time frame:

     "The 3d BATTALION, 127th INFANTRY REGIMENT, is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy near Limon, Leyte, Philippine Islands, from 30 November to 7 December 1944. The 3d BATTALION, 127th INFANTRY REGIMENT, was ordered to attack Hill 400, near Limon, Leyte, Philippine Islands. This hill was the key defensive position of the crack Japanese Imperial 1st Division. The assigned mission was to knock out all installations, annihilate the foe, capture and hold commanding ground which he occupied. The commanding ground of Hill 400 enabled the Japanese not only to defend the hill proper but extensive areas on both the flanks as well. Automatic weapons, mortars, artillery, and small arms which the enemy possessed in great numbers could be utilized from these positions with maximum effectiveness. The irregularity of the slopes and dense undergrowth in many places was a definite handicap to any attacking force. In addition, for several hundred yards from the crest of the objective, the ground was completely barren, affording neither cover nor concealment from enemy observation and fire. The signal to attack was given. Company L on the right made a frontal attack; Company I, supported by Company K, advanced to make a left enveloping movement; Company M, stationed on Bridge Ridge, gave supporting 81mm, 60 mm mortar and overhead machine gun fire. For 8 days a vicious battle raged. Foot by foot, yard by yard, the men of the 3d BATTALION pressed forward against fanatical enemy resistance. Numerous “banzai” counter attacks at times halted our men, and on occasion even compelled them to yield some ground, but their courage and determination never wavered. Temporary reverse only spurred them on to greater efforts. Individual acts of outstanding heroism were numerous. Time and again officers and enlisted men, severely wounded, continued to fight on, rejecting medical aid and refusing to leave the field of battle. Headquarters company personnel kept a constant flow of ammunition and supplies to our embattled forces, despite the terrific enemy fire constantly directed at them. Medical officers and enlisted men attached to the battalion treated our wounded under fire and evacuated them promptly to the rear. These operations were carried out heedless of their personal safety and numerous enemy efforts to prevent their missions of rescue. On the eighth day our men were ready for the final assault on Hill 400. Two hundred yards of barren, open, and exposed ground lay between them and the crest of the hill. Across this ground, devoid of cover and concealment, gallantly our men braved the enemy’s pointblank fire. Doggedly they advanced until the crest was reached. Hand to hand combat ensued when they attained the hill, but our men were not to be denied; they destroyed many defenders and forced the others to flee in panic. In the 8 day battle many enemy were killed and much valuable equipment captured or destroyed. A large number of maps and regimental personnel records of great intelligence value were also captured. The signal victory broke the enemy’s claimed impregnable Yamashita Line, and contributed greatly to the complete and utter defeat of the Japanese troops resisting in the upper Ormoc Valley, and the final collapse of all enemy resistance on Leyte. In outmaneuvering, out fighting, and out lasting a numerically superior foe who had an overwhelming advantage in position and firepower, the officers and men of the 3d BATTALION, 127th INFANTRY REGIMENT, exemplified the finest traditions of American arms." (Blakeley 187-190)

Map of northern Leyte on 7 December 1944, from Leyte: The Return to the Philippines.

Camouflaged U.S. tanks are shown on Highway 2, between Limon and Lonoy, Leyte, Philippines.

On 15 December, SGT Leroy Johnson was leading 3 other soldiers from Co. K, 126th Infantry, in an attempt to eliminate a Japanese machine gun position. When SGT Johnson saw 2 grenades land near his soldiers, he threw himself on them and sacrificed his own life to save the lives of his soldiers. SGT Johnson was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. SGT Johnson, from Oakdale, LA, had previously been awarded the Silver Star for his gallantry near Sanananda, during the Papuan Campaign. SGT Johnson's Medal of Honor citation can be read on the 32nd Division Medal of Honor page of this web site.

On 15 December, PFC Dirk J. Vlug, from the 1st BN, 126th Infantry, single handedly destroyed 5 Japanese tanks that threatened his unit's position. PFC Vlug was awarded the Medal of Honor for "one of the most heroic exploits of the war but also as an amazing example of the efficient use of weapons under the most difficult circumstances (Blakeley 192)." PFC Vlug, age 29, was from Grand Rapids, MI, and had joined the 126th Infantry at Camp Livingston, LA. Dirk Vlug passed away in Grand Rapids, MI, on 25 June 1996.

Technician Fourth Grade James J. Madigan, from Munsing, MI, was an eye witness of the event: “My battalion had set up a roadblock along the Ormoc Road to prevent the Japs from getting behind our lines. In the after . . . we saw five Jap tanks coming down the road. The first tank was laying a smoke screen to conceal their movements. They started firing at us with heavy machine guns and 37 mm cannons. All of us took cover except Private Vlug, who grabbed a rocket launcher and about six rounds of ammunition. I saw him move out toward the road by himself. The Japs in the lead tank started to direct heavy machine gun fire at him.” (qtd. in Blakeley 192)

CPT James K. Sullivan also provided testimony of the event: “With one accurately fired round, he knocked out the first tank, killing its occupants. The second one stopped. Nip soldiers came out to attack Vlug. Using his pistol, he instantly killed one of them and forced the rest to return to the tank. Before they could get it moving, he used his launcher to demolish the vehicle. Meanwhile three more Jap tanks were moving up the road. Sighting Vlug, they immediately opened fire with their machine guns. Maneuvering to one side, he succeeded in putting the third tank out of action with a shot from his launcher. Despite the hail of enemy bullets, he pressed the attack against the remaining two tanks, which were now at close range. He destroyed still another of these tanks with his bazooka. Using his last round of ammo, he hit the last tank as it was trying to move around the burning wreckage of the other tanks, putting it out of control and causing it to swerve off the road and fall down a steep embankment." (qtd. in Blakeley 192)

PFC Vlug's Medal of Honor citation can be read on the 32nd Division Medal of Honor page of this web site.

Co. C, 127th Inf. was awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation (now known as the Presidential Unit Citation) for establishing a roadblock on Highway 2 (a.k.a. the Ormoc Highway) and repelling a strong enemy attack on 15 December:

     "COMPANY C, 127th INFANTRY REGIMENT, is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy near the Ormoc Highway, Leyte, Philippine Islands, on 15 December 1944. As a result of a wide flanking movement by our forces a large Japanese pocket was trapped. The only supply or evacuation route open to this enemy force was the Ormoc Highway. On 15 December 1944, COMPANY C, 127th INFANTRY REGIMENT, was ordered to establish a roadblock on the Ormoc Highway to prevent these troops form being supplied or reinforced. Many enemy tanks were known to be in the area and were expected to resist any attempt by our forces to establish or maintain the block. The men of COMPANY C, armed with grenades, rifles, automatic weapons, mortars and bazookas, had just moved into position when the enemy struck. Ten light tanks supported by well-armed ground troops comprised the enemy force. In addition, the enemy directed intense 75-mm and 150-mm artillery fire against COMPANY C’s positions. Although the men were subject to point-blank fire from the enemy tanks, a hail of bullets from the numerically superior enemy ground troops, and the point-blank fire from the enemy artillery, they never ceased to face the challenge and return the fire to the foe. The men of COMPANY C, by accuracy of their fire and excellent coordination of small arms and bazookas, completely routed the enemy. The mortars and a special patrol succeeded in putting out of action two 75-mm and one 150-mm artillery piece which the enemy had been employing. When the smoke of the battle cleared there remained nine enemy tanks completely destroyed and the other severely damaged. The crews of these tanks as well as many of the supporting ground troops were killed. An aggressive assault against the disorganized remnants of the routed foe resulted in his complete annihilation. The courage and disregard for personal safety shown by the officers and enlisted men of COMPANY C, 127th INFANTRY REGIMENT, are a credit to the armed forces. This operation was a determining factor in the final successful break-through by our troops during the following days and played a vital role in the successful completion of the task of breaking all enemy resistance on Leyte.

On 20 December at 1245, the 127th Infantry assumed responsibility for the 1st BN, 126th Infantry's hard won sector and the battalion moved to an assembly area to the rear.

On 21 December, at about 1645, the lead elements of the 77th Inf. and 1st Cav. Divisions linked up on Highway 2, at a road junction between Kananga and Libongao. The entire highway was now open from Pinamopoan in the north to Ormoc in the south.

"The Ormoc Valley, in which the Japanese had so tenaciously resisted the American advance, was now securely in the hands of Sixth Army. The northern and southern prongs of the trap had closed. There remained only Palompon as an exit for the Japanese forces. To the securing of that port, the X and XXIV Corps, acting in concert, could concentrate their main efforts. Plans had been readied. The Sixth Army was poised in a position from which it could drive westward to the sea and bring the Leyte campaign to a successful conclusion." (Cannon 346)

"In General Marshall’s biennial report, previous quoted; the last phase of the Leyte Campaign is briefly summarized:

U.S. Army Signal Corps photo from National Archives & Records Administration Troops of the 127th Inf., 32nd Div., look over burning Japanese tanks knocked out by American tanks north of Lonoy, Leyte, P.I. on 22 December 1944.

U.S. Army Signal Corps photo from National Archives & Records Administration T5 Russell W. Smith, Service Co., 127th Inf., 32nd Div., of Clarksburg, W. Va., using bulldozer to clear destroyed Japanese tanks from road to Lonoy, Leyte, P.I., to make room for passage of Sherman tanks on 22 December 1944.

"On 22 December, General Gill issued General Orders 104, Headquarters, 32d Infantry Division:

     "Today the “Red Arrow” Division successfully completed its primary mission of forcing a passage through the mountains from Pinamopoan to the Ormoc Valley. After thirty-six days of the bitterest hand-to-hand fighting yet experienced in this war the Division has annihilated the 1st Imperial Division (reinforced), and by this determined action has shortened the completion of the Leyte Campaign.
    "Every officer and every enlisted man in the Division as well as those attached played a vitally important part in the Division’s success.
     "I wish to compliment each individual and to express my personal appreciation for the splendid work accomplished by them in this campaign. Without this coordinated effort of each individual the Division could not have been successful.
     "I extend the Season’s Greetings to each of you, and in so doing, express my confidence in your continued success. May God watch over you and help you through the strenuous days ahead." (Blakeley 197-198)"

On 23 December, the 127th and 128th Inf. dispatched patrols westward and at 0800 on Christmas Eve both regiments began their arduous march toward the coast. Along the way, they met little effective opposition from the small groups of Japanese they ran into. However, the torrential rain, thick vegetation, and steep hills were a formidable obstacle.

" The commanding officer of the 127th Infantry [COL Stofft] said of the hills encountered on 24 December:
    "The morning was spent in climbing to the top of a mountain ridge. The climbing was difficult but as we later found out, the descent was much worse. The trail led almost perpendicular down the side. After reaching the bottom, another ridge was encountered, this almost straight up, everyone had to use hand holds to pull themselves up. All in all there were seven ridges from the bottom of the first descent to the first possible bivouac area." (Cannon 356)"

On Christmas Morning, the 1st BN, 127th Inf., ran into a force of about 400 Japanese, who were quickly dispersed.

    "Supply, which had been a major problem throughout the campaign, was now nearly impossible. Rations were soon low or completely gone. It wasn’t a question of Christmas dinner but rather would they eat at all? The problem was solved largely by the use of the artillery’s “grasshoppers” – the little observation planes that were certainly never designed as cargo carriers. Although their drops were understandably not always accurate, the planes did get enough supplies to the doughboys to enable them to push through to the coast." (Blakeley 198)
    "Carrying 50 lb. loads, the tiny planes shuttled from the airstrip to the advancing troops. All that day and the next they flew, swooping low over the trees to drop the supply cases, and then returning for another load. Shoes, leggins, clothing, food, ammunition, radio batteries, atribrine and all the other items needed on the march made up the cargoes. For two consecutive days the four battalions were completely supplied by this method. It was the largest operation of this kind ever successfully attempted in any theater." (Blakeley 196)

On 25 December, Gen. MacArthur declared that all organized resistance on Leyte had ended. In spite of this declaration, numerous pockets of Japanese forces held out on Leyte for some time. Some of these groups were large and still willing to fight. Eight U.S. divisions were involved, for varying lengths of time, in seeking out and eliminating these pockets from 1 January to 8 May.

By the afternoon of 29 December, both regiments had attained their goals on the west coast of Leyte. The 128th Inf. was looking out over Compopo and Tabango Bays. About three miles to the south, the 127th Inf. had a commanding view of Antipolo Point. Patrols were dispatched to reconnoiter the surrounding areas and to link up with the 1st Cavalry Division to the south as well as the 24th Infantry Division to the north.

    "A last tragic message came into the Division’s command post near Limon on the morning of 31 December 1944, just as it seemed as if the phrase, “Happy New Year” might have a little meaning. Herman Bottcher, the “fine combat soldier” whom General Eichelberger had recommended for promotion to captain from staff sergeant for his leadership in the Buna fighting, had been killed."  (Blakeley 198)

The 32nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop received a citation for its roll in the Leyte campaign.

     "THE 32d CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE TROOP is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy from 20 November 1944  to 2 January 1945 during the Leyte, Philippine Islands campaign. Operating in the Ormoc Valley sector for a period of 43 days, THE 32d CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE TROOP established a patrol base behind enemy lines and near his rear area installations. From this patrol base the troop conducted numerous reconnaissance patrols, harassing raids, and maintained observation posts which directed long-range artillery fire on these installations and activities with devastating result to the enemy. Throughout the period operations were conducted under the most adverse conditions of weather and terrain. Heavy rains, with difficult mountainous jungle tracks and intermingled open valleys and forested mountains, made the movement of patrols ever subject to fire from enemy troops which occupied the area. The troop, operating with an average of 80 men from which its patrols and command posts were drawn, was attacked by enemy forces 14 times, but each attack was driven off and a total of 86 Japanese killed, with several hundred more being credited to artillery fire directed by the troop’s observation posts. Ambushes set by the troop resulted in the capture of 11 prisoners of war for intelligence interrogation. The harassing raids resulted in the destruction of three important bridges over which the enemy was moving supplies, and the reconnaissance patrols pinpointed three artillery positions upon which counterbattery fire was placed. Patrols also furnished information on troop movements and concentrations in the Ormoc Valley from Valencia to Lonoy and west to Palompon. This information, because of its timeliness and accuracy, permitted large scale tactical planning which contributed greatly to the utter defeat of the Japanese troops resisting in the upper Ormoc Valley and the final collapse of all enemy resistance on Leyte." (Blakeley 198-200)

"General Krueger paid tribute to the troops of Sixth Army in a general order at the end of the Leyte operations:

     "The combat troops have displayed the highest degree of gallantry, skill, tenacity and fortitude in fighting a resourceful and determined enemy under adverse conditions of weather and on exceedingly difficult terrain. They have added a glorious page to the history of our army and the country. The exploits of the combat troops were equaled by the devoted highly effective work of the service units, who are deserved of the highest praise for unremittingly toiling day and night to serve and support their comrades in the battle line." (Blakeley 201)"

Blakeley, H. W., Major General, Retired.  The 32nd Infantry Division in World War II.  The Thirty-second Infantry Division History Commission, State of Wisconsin, n.d.
Cannon, M. Hamlin.  Leyte: The Return to the Philippines.  U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1954.
Drea, Edward J.  New Guinea - The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II.  U.S. Army Center of Military History, n.d.
Hill, Jim Dan, Major General, Retired.  The Minute Man in Peace and War.  Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 1964.
Jungwirth, Clarence J.  Diary of a National Guardsman in World War II.  Oshkosh, WI: Poeschl Printing Company, 1991.
Milner, Samuel. Victory in Papua.  U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1957.
Papuan Campaign - The Buna-Sanananda Operation.  Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, War Department, 1945.
The Red Arrow - 1955 - The 32nd Division, Wisconsin National Guard.  n.p., 1955.
Smith, Herbert M., Lieutenant Colonel, Retired. Hannibal Had Elephants II.  Eau Claire, WI: Rev. William A. Heins, 1995.